The border standoff between India and China in Galwan in 2020 was the worst since the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan.
While conducting a massive exercise, the Chinese army had redirected a sizable portion of its forces into different locations along its side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
There have been reports of transgressions in the ‘Finger’ area of Pangong Lake, the greater Hot Springs area, and several other areas in eastern Ladakh. This conflict occurred inspite of the global Covid-19 outbreak, which was mostly caused by China.
Such attitude was viewed as aggressive and shocking in India. The Indian military responded appropriately. It held its ground and made tit-for-tat strategic land grabs as well.
For the last three years, both sides had persisted in holding last-held territory. Their numbers in use are still improved. Both parties have quickened the rate at which infrastructure is being built. There are now more weapon systems available. Light battle tanks and other more advanced weaponry are now in development.
The impasse persists despite 21 rounds of discussions at the level of military commanders. In the meantime, as India commemorates 25 years of winning the Kargil War, it is pertinent to examine the lessons that still hold true for the conflict on the Lakhchin Peninsula.
Pakistan Army tactics in Kargil War
General Pervez Musharraf’s command for the Pakistan Army to seize Indian Army posts—which were customarily cleared out every winter and reoccupied in the summer—forced India to enter the Kargil War.
Pakistan’s strategy was to seize control of the Srinagar-Kargil Highway and severe the vital transportation connection to Ladakh. Not even the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was informed.
A combination of the infiltration plan by the Pakistan Army and an intelligence failure on the part of India led to the Kargil War.
One of the world’s highest battlefields saw action during the Kargil War, which lasted from May 3 to July 26, 1999, between India and Pakistan. International recognition was bestowed upon the young officers whose courage and leadership inspired and guided courageous jawans.
The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) “Operation Safed Sagar” air operations helped the Indian army win handily. In all, Pakistan lost approximately 700 men while almost 500 Indian soldiers were killed in action.
It was also the first direct conventional conflict between two powers that had just declared their possession of nuclear weapons. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) carefully considered the use of air power and its escalation dynamics before approving the IAF’s ability to launch unlimited operations on the infiltrators on May 25, 1999, “without crossing the Line of Control” (LoC). On May 26, full-scale air operations got underway.
IAF role in Kargil War
The IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft flown by Flt Lt Nachiketa on May 27 itself when high-altitude rocket fire caused an engine failure. He was captured and made a Prisoner of War. Despite the threat of Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, who was escorting Nachiketa in a MiG 21, dropped in an attempt to locate the downed pilot and was shot down by a Stinger shoulder-fired missile.
The next day, a SAM attack caused a Mi-17 to be shot down, killing all four crew members. There was no operational infrared flare dispenser on the aircraft. The IAF was obliged to review its plan in light of these defeats.
The helicopters were taken out of offensive missions right away. After that, all bombing was done at a high height. Laser guided bomb (LGB)-equipped Mirage 2000 aircraft were introduced. The other combatants used gravity bombs to launch their strikes.
During the remainder of the fight, close to 100 SAMs were fired, but no more hits or losses occurred. The hard way was taught to IAF.
In Kargil, the targets ranged from 16 to 18,000. The majority of weaponry and planes are not made to be fired at such high altitudes. Nobody had previously trained the delivery of weapons at these altitudes.
Strike aircraft’s options for attack directions were restricted by the directive not to cross the Line of Command. The aircraft had to exit the attack over 30,000 feet in order to avoid SAMs. To obtain direct hits at those altitudes, the IAF had to adapt aircraft and aiming systems using creativity, or Indian “Jugaad”.
The IAF targeted enemy artillery positions, logistic camps, and tiny shelters. In the Dras Sector, the IAF attacked enemy positions at Point 4388, Tiger Hill, and Muntho Dhalo.
In addition to helping to reverse the tide of battle and speed up the retake of high mountain peaks, the precise dropping of dumb bombs and laser guided bombs by Mirage 2000, Mig-27, Jaguar, and MiG-21 aircraft also significantly decreased Indian Army losses.
The fact that Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, begged the Indian government to “stop the air strikes” on June 12, 1999, during an official visit to New Delhi at the height of the conflict, is evidence of the success of the IAF’s attacks.
According to the Ministry of Defence’s annual report, the IAF flew 7831 sorties in all. Up to 1730 by fighters (22.7%), 3427 by transport planes (44.9%), and 2474 by helicopters (32.4%) were involved.
A little over 48% of fighter sorties were used for striking operations. An additional 39% is allocated to Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and Escort missions for the Air Defence. The percentage of Recce missions was close to 13%.
India exposes nuclear bluff by Pakistan
Pakistan’s frequently-used nuclear threat bluff was revealed, even in spite of Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad’s May 31 statement cautioning that an intensification of the limited confrontation could force Pakistan to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. It was once again possible for a conventional battle to occur under a nuclear cloud.
Lessons from Kargil War
The lack of interagency coordination between RAW, IB, and military intelligence in the run-up to the war was brought to light in the Kargil Review Committee report. It was discovered that human intelligence was lacking. The entire national security apparatus was thoroughly examined.
The appointment of a full-time National Security Advisor (NSA) was made possible by the report. UAVs and Indian RISAT satellites have been used to improve aerial surveillance. The National Technical Research Organization (NTRO), a centralized body for electronic intelligence and communication, was established in 2004. There is now a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA).
The suggestions led to the establishment of the Strategic Forces Command, the Nuclear Command Authority, the Andaman and Nicobar Command, the Defence Acquisition Council, and the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS).
The creation of a Special Forces section and the Defence Space and Cyber Agencies occurred more recently. And lastly, the position of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was created at the start of 2020. Discussions on the creation of theater commands are progressing to an advanced level. The most crucial real civil-military integration inside the MoD remains.
