India has a packed diplomatic schedule for this week. A month after visiting Russia amid the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is currently visiting Poland and Ukraine.
In the meantime, he welcomed Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim earlier this week, bringing about a much-needed rapprochement with Malaysia, India’s maritime neighbor.
In the midst of all of this, the Tuesday-ended 2+2 ministerial meeting between Japan and India is an important diplomatic engagement that has not received enough attention.
Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh led the Indian side at the third edition of this dialogue, while Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defence Minister Kihara Minoru led the Japanese side. It takes place two years after the foreign and defense ministers of the two nations last convened in Tokyo.
Since then, a great deal has happened in the world. While the war between Russia and Ukraine has taken precedence over other geopolitical issues for the other major powers, the Indo-Pacific region is still crucial for both Japan and India.
Japan has long been concerned about China’s ascent and its expansionist plans in the East China Sea in addition to the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, Beijing’s rising presence in the Indian Ocean and a similar attempt to grab Indian land in the Himalayas by wild claims continue to alarm New Delhi.
It’s interesting to note that, with Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” and India’s Act East strategy aligning, both nations have grown to be close allies in maintaining general security and stability in the Indo-Pacific area.
It’s interesting to note that last year, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida called India a “indispensable partner” when he unveiled his new strategy plan for FOIP from New Delhi. This demonstrated the significance of India’s ascent to Japan’s regional strategy.
Though it is fair to say that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who first used the term “Indo-Pacific” on the floor of the Indian parliament in 2007 and formally introduced the FOIP in 2016, was the original architect of the initiative.
Since then, it has grown to be the cornerstone of Japan’s regional China policy, which views a robust alliance with India as essential protection against Chinese blunders.
While noting the importance of India-Japan bilateral ties, Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa has also written a column for an Indian national daily on the eve of her visit for the 2+2 Ministerial dialogue. This is her first visit to India after becoming the foreign minister of the country, but she has been a long-term advocate for India-Japan friendship.
In the column, she has called the two countries ‘co-creators of new solutions’ with their friendship built on a foundation of long historical ties as well as their common status as democracies.
Over the past ten years, India and Japan have expanded their bilateral relations to include a variety of sectors, from defense to commercial ties, all driven by their general convergence.
The primary focus of their relations is undoubtedly security, since both nations face a mutual strategic threat due to China’s expansionist policies.
In response, their defense cooperation has increased significantly over the past few years thanks to high-level engagements and joint military exercises. India has also asked Japan to remove barriers to the exchange of cutting-edge defense technology during this year’s 2+2 talks. India is currently obtaining UNICORN technology from Japan, which will be installed in Indian warships and provide them with an enhanced ability to elude enemy forces.
As part of the Made in India (Defence) project, the two nations are also looking into methods to collaborate on the production of essential defense equipment. Rather than just being a customer in this equation, India has placed a strong emphasis on cooperative manufacture, research, and design of defense platforms with Japan.
India has greatly benefited economically from Japan’s investment in the northeast Japan has demonstrated a sincere commitment to developing the northeastern states of India, which not only have complex socioeconomic issues but also challenging geographical terrain, in contrast to other development partners who search for simpler initiatives.
Using Bangladesh’s Matarbari seaport to connect the region with the Bay of Bengal, India and Japan are attempting to establish an industrial value chain. This initiative was also discussed during this week’s ministerial dialogue.
Bangladesh and the northeastern states of India now count Japan as their top development partner abroad. Its long-term participation in the area—previously it was handling projects in Bangladesh and India independently—has culminated in its initiative to create an industrial value chain. Up until now, it has built roads and other infrastructure, but the idea of an industrial value chain has completely changed the scope of the role.
In addition to their cooperation in the Bay of Bengal, India and Japan are constructing India’s first high-speed rail link, which will run between Mumbai and Ahmedabad. Its foundation is the renowned Shinkansen technology from Japan, which allows trains to travel at up to 320 km/h.
On India’s western edge, an economic corridor funded by Japan is taking shape, connecting seven Indian states from Delhi to Mumbai. Given its own aging population, it would not only give Japanese businesses access to the sizable labor market in India’s, but also increase India’s involvement in international value chains. Twenty businesses, many of them are international organizations based in East Asia, started operating out of this corridor last year.
There may still be some obstacles even if there are still many reasons to elevate India-Japan relations. First off, because of the numerous corruption scandals that have surfaced involving his ministers, Prime Minister Kishida, under whose leadership India-Japan relations have greatly improved, is no longer a popular figure in Japan. He’s stated that he will be leaving office in September, thus his time in office is running out. Regarding the incoming government’s stance on India-Japan relations, there will probably be some ambiguity in the short run, but overall strategic convergence will probably win out.
Then there’s the issue of Japan’s perspective on China appearing to be little clouded. The reason for this is that, in contrast to its 2022 National Security Strategy, which categorically referred to China as the “greatest strategic challenge,” its 2023 NSS unexpectedly presented a story of a “mutually beneficial” relationship with the nation.
It’s interesting to note that the concept of a national security policy originated in 2013 in response to China’s increasing aggression in Japan’s backyard. Japan first established a national security council in response to the threat posed by China. Nonetheless, given its reliance on China economically, Japan might be persuaded to adopt a more accommodating stance toward Beijing in the present.
Even with all the rhetoric of decoupling, China and Japan are involved in major trade initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), indicating that more integration rather than a decline is the trend in their relationship.
Further evidence of their increased economic cooperation comes from the trilateral free trade pact that South Korea, China, Japan, and South Korea restored this year.
Many Japanese businesses have even embraced the “China for China” approach, which entails increasing their deeper investments in the nation in order to cater to the sizable local market in China.
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In summary, Japan’s overall strategy toward China would continue to be influenced by its economic links, which would then have an impact on the Indo-Pacific region’s cohesive force between India and Japan.
However, there are other separate forces driving the advancement of their bilateral relations between Japan and India. This includes the growing middle class in India and the attraction of its sizable consumer base for Japanese consumers. Japan’s technological know-how, expertise, and investments in establishing India as a global industrial hub are also highly valued by India. Over the next five years, it wants to invest five trillion yen from Japan.
For the time being, there is enough for the two nations to pursue a deeper collaboration. In the meanwhile, China’s assertive stance will continue to serve as a timely reminder to Japan to reduce the risk associated with its reliance on China and consider India as an alternative.
