Following the chaotic mass rallies that overthrew former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, India is doing business as usual in South Asia despite two high-level visits by the Indian government to as many of its neighbors in the southern Indian Ocean.
External Affairs Minister (EAM) S Jaishankar’s trip was a “return visit” following meetings with Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu and Foreign Minister Moosa Zameer in New Delhi, both jointly and separately. The former was held in conjunction with the swearing-in of incumbent Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a record-breaking third term.
Ajit Doval, the National Security Advisor (NSA), was in the capital of Sri Lanka not long after taking part in the yearly NSA-level gathering of the 2020 Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) signatories.
The first was of a bilateral nature and was delivered by a high-ranking Indian official following unwarranted tensions in bilateral ties that President Muizzu and his administration had caused, which had implications for the security and stability of the area. In the latter, the NSA made a break to meet with the four front-runners in the September 21 Sri Lankan presidential election, with a direct focus on regional security and stability.
The main focus of EAM Jaishankar’s visit was the necessity of increased Indian participation in the crisis-ridden Maldives’ economic rehabilitation before it became much worse. That was the case when the situation forced India, the regional power with regional obligations extending across national borders, to intervene and provide funding for Sri Lanka’s recovery, beginning with the provision of food, fuel, medications, and other necessities for the Colombo regime to get past the dollar crisis that had been the root of the country’s import shortages for the previous two years.
In response, NSA Doval co-signed an agreement in Colombo to establish the CSC Secretariat in the nation’s capital. The purpose of the August 30 ceremony was to formally establish the informal agreement, which would also make more sense in the event that Sri Lanka’s elected administration changed. Notably, the Maldivian NSA also signed the Memorandum of Understanding shortly after Muizzu took office as president in mid-November of last year, having abstained from the last NSA-level gathering in Mauritius. This time, the MoU was not signed by Bangladesh, which is still in the process of transitioning, as was predicted. The fact that Bangladesh and the Seychelles are still only “observers” at the CSC raises another issue.
The primary goal of the CSC is to confront transnational dangers and issues that the Member States share in order to strengthen regional security, as stated in an official statement from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in India. “Maritime Safety and Security, Countering Terrorism and Radicalization, Combating Trafficking and Transnational Organized Crime, Cyber Security and Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Technology, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief” are the five pillars of cooperation under the CSC, according to a statement from the MEA.
In other words, the CSC’s current mandate is centered on non-traditional security cooperation, such as cyber security and terrorism. The opportunities for advancing the goals and broadening the scope, however, are immense given that South Asia is experiencing turbulent waters and unrest along its land borders. This is primarily because of China’s unfriendly presence, which views both the US and India as rival nations—the US for historical reasons, and Beijing as a potential superpower that no one is willing to acknowledge just yet. This comprises a few of the country’s client states, such as North Korea and Pakistan, as well as little spheres of influence in other parts of the globe.
Media sources state that during EAM Jaishankar’s visit, plans were talked about how India could assist the Maldives in coping with an impending economic catastrophe. This is reportedly a customary hand-me-down from before the Maldives became democratic in 2008, as well as a legacy issue. The administration acknowledges that there is a debt crisis and a dollar crunch, even in spite of the resurgence of the core tourism industry following COVID-19.
The primary commercial bank of the country, Bank of Maldives (BML), has recently experienced a development that could cause market panic. This could deter foreign suppliers, particularly those from India, which is the primary source of all necessities, such as rice, sugar, flour, eggs, and medications. If such a scenario materialized, it would have a significant impact on bilateral ties in the upcoming months, if not years, on how New Delhi steps in to relieve the escalating situation, just as it did in Sri Lanka two years ago.
On the other hand, it appeared that NSA Doval persuaded his listeners in Colombo that India would cooperate with the President that Sri Lankans elected and that India had no particular preference among the major contenders. It appears that the message was received favorably and convincingly. Even if the current President of Sri Lanka is elected to a five-year term instead of the current two-year term nominated by Parliament, there are still challenges that both Colombo and New Delhi will have to deal with.
Additionally, Sri Lanka is starting to serve as a benchmark for Indian investments, which are frequently made via or by companies in the private sector like the Adani Group. Among other things, their green energy projects in Sri Lanka’s Tamil North are mired in environmental controversy. Following the inauguration of a new president, the matter is scheduled for hearing before the Sri Lankan Supreme Court in October. A lot of attention will be paid to how the post-election government handles the legal case and related matters while awaiting the legislative elections that will occur shortly after.
In addition to attending to Sri Lanka’s pressing needs regarding food, gasoline, and finances, New Delhi made history when Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman personally persuaded Colombo to seek a bailout package from the IMF’s leaders during a routine visit to their Washington headquarters.
Though that isn’t always the case, acts like these should keep the Indian flag flying high in Sri Lanka. There are long-standing opponents of India in Sri Lanka who will not go away, even after Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha recently handed over a check for the first tranche of cash for the hybrid power projects that New Delhi has promised.
Painting them with a China brush, however, is inaccurate because many of them are indigenous and existed long before Beijing started to show strategic interest in the area. Yes, the destiny and future of the one-year ban that the current government has placed on foreign research vessels’ access to Sri Lankan ports and waterways would need to be decided by the president who will take office after the election. The US and India reportedly put pressure on the moratorium’s implementation earlier this year because they were unhappy with Chinese research ships visiting these waters on a yearly basis.
China was suspected of spying on India, a neighbor, through its oceans, land, and airspace, even as Chinese ships studied the mineral resources and other features of these waterways with an eye toward the future, both strategically and economically. The US believed or predicted that the alleged Chinese research vessels would be spying on the US military capabilities in these waters because the US has the renowned Diego Garcia facility there.
Therefore, it remains to be seen how the Maldivian Muizzu government will respond to future Chinese requests to berth those research vessels in the Male port—ostensibly for staff rotation and replenishing, as stated during the two fleeting visits in the shared waters—after Jaishankar’s visit.
The ship, which may have been redirected from Sri Lanka after the ban, was “researching” in the waters beyond the Maldivian EEZ for a full month—that is, between the two berthings—which generated headlines but was mostly ignored. The Maldives asserted at the time that the Chinese ship conducted no research in their territorial seas.
The current indications are that bilateral ties, particularly in the economic domain, will strengthen along the lines outlined in the “Vision Statement” and the Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) signed between the two sides during President Wickremesinghe’s visit to New Delhi last year, regardless of the outcome of the presidential election in Sri Lanka. Their main objective was to enhance and promote the interpersonal relationships between the two nations. In the postmodern world, the idea of building a sea bridge between the two countries—first proposed by Wickremesinghe as prime minister in 2003—connects the island nation to the south Indian markets and serves as Sri Lanka’s entry point to the Eurasian mainland.
The two countries have resumed flights connecting southern Tamil Nadu cities to Jaffna town (Palaly air base, specifically) as a follow-up to the Wickremesinghe visit. The acceptance of air connection appears to be higher. Similar to that, the two sides have revived the long-forgotten ferry service that connects southern Tamil Nadu with northern Sri Lanka, and it seems to be gaining steam.
However, when the new administration takes office in Colombo, there will be ambiguities that the parties involved must resolve. It has to do with bringing in Indian private sector companies to work on development projects in Sri Lanka, whether or not New Delhi provides funds for them. Sri Lanka’s economy, which is still reeling from the shocks and pressures of 2022, needs foreign investments in strategic sectors of the economy right now. India must deal with the nation’s institutionalized troublemakers and come up with workable answers.
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It will also be the strategy that New Delhi must use to advance its bilateral economic relations with the Maldives. Any elected leader in Male faces internal obstacles despite the present economic crisis, particularly someone like Muizzu whose sizable electoral base consists of traditional conservatives who also take great pleasure in promoting “Maldivian nationalism.” It is known as “Maldivian Islamic nationalism” by some of them. The two are not the same, and Muizzu, for example, seems to be trying to find a way to make his commitments to China clear if he has to gain the favor of a neighbor like India, which is still uneasy, if not suspicious, about them.
Such a shift toward neighborhood economic linkages in the south, as and when stabilized, would greatly benefit New Delhi, mending the gaps and splits in the north rather than with its northeastern neighbors. Predicted grievances against India’s identification with the disgraced Sheikh Hasina in Dhaka are already starting to come in during Bangladesh’s transition.
India’s challenge is persuading its neighbors, political parties, and general populace that New Delhi will only work with the government that they choose through democratic elections. India took this action, for example, in the cases of President Ibrahim Solih in the Maldives and Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh. However, it was misconstrued since New Delhi refrained from speaking with the opposing side(s) for fear of “interfering in the internal affairs” of those nations.
NSA Doval appears to have won India’s opening round in Sri Lanka. With the possible exception of Pakistan and Afghanistan for the time being, such a strategic strategy rather than tactical preferences might go a long way toward healing bridges between India and all of its neighbors. However, what can bring about the shift is a consistent policy approach, a nuanced expression of it, and the unavoidable financial assistance that comes with being a part of regional responsibility. However, change is inevitable and necessary.
