There have been a lot of important discussions about the border dispute between China and India over the past week. India’s External Affairs Minister, S Jaishankar, emphasized the extraordinary importance of bilateral ties during his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meetings.
The disruptions to peace and quiet at the borders, which have harmed ties over the previous four years, were another issue raised by the EAM. Jaishankar restated that the three mutuals—mutual respect, mutual interest, and mutual sensitivity—should serve as the foundation for the relationships.
In 2021, Jaishankar presented this strategy and the eight principles in a virtual keynote speech at the All-India Conference of China Studies.
The latest remarks by Jaishankar about the ongoing border dispute in eastern Ladakh came even the military standoff between India and China – the two giants of Asia – is about to enter its sixth year.
Speaking at the Foreign Ministers Meeting of the 14th East Asia Summit in Vientiane, Jaishankar emphasized the importance of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) that cross the South China Sea for the Indo-Pacific region’s peace, stability, prosperity, and growth.
According to him, the Code of Conduct ought to be practical and meaningful, adhere to international law, and respect the rights and interests of countries that aren’t involved in the talks.
Jaishankar’s words carried extra weight because Wang Yi, his Chinese counterpart, was also in Vientiane for the conference. Because to China’s recent assertive activities, the resource-rich South China Sea has turned into a hot zone.
While attending a Quad foreign ministers conference in Tokyo, Jaishankar said that China and India’s relationship is not progressing well. In the ongoing border conflict between India and China, he ruled out the involvement of any third party and emphasized that the two neighbors must work out a solution on their own.
China put out an interesting statement regarding the meeting between Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi.
“The two sides agreed to make concerted efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas, and work for new progress in consultations on border affairs,” the Chinese statement read.
The words “new progress” contained in the Chinese statement will pique the interest of discerning readers.
China has, however, finished building a 400-meter bridge close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, according to recent media reports. Additionally, the bridge is now black-topped and in use by light-duty vehicles, according to recent satellite pictures. This all begs the question of how eager their Chinese colleagues are to ease relations with India.
To comprehend Chinese perceptions and its genuine intentions in settling the current standoff with India, some historical background is first necessary. With the exception of India and Bhutan, China has resolved its land border disputes with all 14 of its neighbors. China has signed a three-step plan to expedite and settle boundary disputes, even with Bhutan.
It is important to remember, though, that historically, China has maintained its strategic and economic interests while resolving those boundary disputes and territory disputes. Beijing has linked its “independent foreign policy of peace”—a position emphasized as early as 2003—to sovereignty and territorial integrity in light of the current conditions surrounding China.
In his speech at the Central National Security Commission of the CPC’s founding session in 2014, President Xi Jinping proposed the term “Comprehensive National Security,” which broadens the meaning of national security and incorporates security into every area.
“Territorial Security” is one of the sixteen security categories that now make up this idea. Since Mao’s time, the idea of territorial security has been crucial, and now it takes center stage when it comes to China’s centennial objective of “national rejuvenation.” This also clarifies Beijing’s recent aggressive maneuvering toward Taiwan and its operations against the Philippines in the South China Sea.
Second, China’s focus has gradually switched from its western and northern land boundaries to its eastern borders, which are primarily maritime in nature, after boundary disputes with 14 nations were resolved. China has always been worried about a US-Japan maritime conflict in the East and South China Seas, and this worry has grown since Quad and AUKUS were formalized. China’s concerns for US engagement in any Chinese-related conflict have intensified with the building and opening of Camp Blaz, the first new US facility since 1952, on the US Pacific Island of Guam.
China believes that India may support the United States in this conflict and use the opportunity to press its demands in the border dispute between Beijing and New Delhi. It should be mentioned that only India shares a physical border with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) out of the four Quadrant nations. Beijing must therefore manage a two-pronged situation.
India is the common denominator between the two Chinese strategic calculation scenarios. China’s remarks have also been clear-cut, expressing unease about India’s growing closeness to the US.
It is also necessary to mention Beijing’s first “Land Borders Law,” which establishes guidelines for border integration and security. On January 1, 2022, this statute became operative. It provides a “legal cover” for the People’s Republic of China to employ military force and commit breaches along the LAC, with 62 articles spread across 7 chapters.
Beijing’s approach, then, will not stay the same under the new regime of Xi Jinping, where security will always come first and economic growth will be balanced with military modernization and national revitalization.
Also Read: How India is successfully countering China in Indo-Pacific and beyond
Chinese gestures towards India could be explained by all of these causes, which also give rise to a sense of urgency in ending the current conflict. This strategy embodies the well-known Chinese proverb [tāo guāng yœng huì], which can be loosely translated as “hiding one’s strength and biding one’s time.”
Deng Xiaoping first proposed this concept in the 1980s when describing China’s foreign policy; it also meant keeping a low profile and concealing one’s true intentions and goals in order to gain the upper hand over adversaries.
The lesson for India may not involve crystal gazing; rather, it may involve maintaining its tough stance, keeping an eye out for any future misstep by China, and making sure that the “new progress” of China’s ongoing illegal occupation at the border does not turn into the “new normal.”
