For a nation, maintaining friendly and productive relationships with its neighbors is both essential and difficult. The explanation is simple: the neighborhood is where the greatest risk is present because it is where attacks usually occur. India is not an anomaly.
History, culture, and civilization have served as the “umbilical cord” that has bound India and her neighbors together for ages. Because proximity produces both comfort and disdain, neighborhood interactions are inevitably nuanced and intricate. This is particularly true in a nation like India, where most neighbors are connected by what may be referred to as a “civilizational relationship”.
India’s approach to its neighbor in South Asia, besides Pakistan, swings between two extremes: Indira Gandhi’s regional superpower and security strategy, and Indira Kumar Gujral’s more accommodative approach, known as the Gujral Doctrine. Narendra Modi gave these two strategies an emphasis on the economic side.
However, India’s core objectives have not changed: maintaining India’s dominance in South Asia and preventing other powerful nations from meddling in the area.
The pursuit of regional supremacy by the Indian state is frequently perceived by its neighbors with resentment as a bid for hegemony. New Delhi has realized lately that it needs to reconsider its previous strategy of trying to keep its neighbors and outside forces from engaging. Additionally, a vigorous struggle for influence is necessary, especially with China.
In light of this, India faces a number of obstacles in its immediate neighbourhood, including the persistent anti-Indian sentiment in South Asia, which is present in places like Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives. Rhetoric against India plays a crucial role in inflaming public opinion in order to further political goals. India can be seen as a seemingly never-ending home problem in the struggle for political dominance. These problems in South Asia were made worse by India’s foolish policy of favoritism toward political competitors within these countries.
A clear illustration of the erroneous Indian approach of promoting Sheikh Hasina alone at the expense of other political players is the current political crisis in Bangladesh. Despite ideological or political differences, a mature foreign policy necessitates close, ongoing, constructive exchanges with all parties. How well a foreign policy handles divergences and creates convergences is a litmus test.
The other challenges are structural in nature; the asymmetry between India and other South Asian countries in terms of size, population, economy, and overall CNP (comprehensive national power) fosters a persistent sense of overdependence on India and the perception of an infringement on their strategic autonomy and full exercise of sovereignty. They search for alternatives to balance India in order to break away from what they see as its confining grip.
South Asian countries frequently use the “China card” while defending their foreign policies. China is no longer just India’s counterweight given its increasing economic and political clout. China is now a significant economic ally for the nations of South Asia.
China has a significant economic presence throughout the area, largely to the cost of India’s influence, thanks to its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China wants to replace the US as the leading global power, and to do so it has taken an assertive foreign policy stance in Asia and South Asia.
China’s strategic goal has been to use its tiny neighbors to keep India out of South Asian issues; but, for this to happen, there must be irritants between India and these neighbors. China is trying to gain influence in the area by working to settle its boundary issues with all of the South Asian countries, with the exception of India, and by making recent overtures to Bhutan.
India is negatively portrayed by its entangled border issues. Similar to any other regional force, India faces two challenges. First, although being far stronger than its neighbors, it is unable to impose its will on regional agreements and force them to fit its strategic goals. Second, it frequently vies for influence in the area with other superpowers.
In contrast to China, India is a resident power that is vulnerable to spillovers such as ethnic strife and refugees. Tension is exacerbated by everything that connects India to its neighbors, including language, culture, and customs. Sometimes little problems grow to be major ones.
In contrast to India, China is a non-resident power in South Asia and does not have the same sensitivities. The over-reliance of South Asian countries on China has its limits because they are merely pieces on the geopolitical chessboard that is South Asia.
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On the other hand, regional peace and prosperity are inextricably tied to India’s economic, human, and environmental security. Although it has long been a constant in the region, the USA, another significant global player in the area, has recently become less of a geopolitical influence in South Asia. Though Washington’s goals occasionally conflict with those of India, its presence in South Asia hasn’t always been advantageous for New Delhi.
For example, in Bangladesh, the obstacle to stable and friendly relations is the USA rather than China. The US desired regime change in Dhaka. Similar to how the US showed no concern when radical Islamists won power following government changes in Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia, the US administration doesn’t appear to worry that the regime transition will boost parties antagonistic to cordial ties with India, particularly Islamist fundamentalists.
The US’s stance of ignoring the persistent China-Pakistan Axis gives the policy of establishing fake parity between India and Pakistan more confidence. India’s regional security interests are never effectively served by the close ties between the US government and the Pakistani army. All things considered, India’s neighborhood problems are a result of its complex and close relationships with its neighbors, structural problems between them, and the US and China’s competing interests.
India must acknowledge that there has been a significant shift in the balance of power in South Asia. India’s hegemonic status in South Asia has disappeared, and China is now a formidable rival for control of the region. China also owns India’s neighbors and the periphery, despite our hate for it. If India abandoned the antiquated notion of Indian primacy and instead embraced a pragmatic and realistic framework, it could deal with reality more skillfully.
Secondly, New Delhi needs to make a concerted effort to engage with benevolent external entities in the area. The economic, commerce, and connectivity components of partnerships must be emphasized in addition to the cultural and historical linkages. The gap between promise and delivery needs to be closed, and private sector involvement is needed to ensure that infrastructure projects are completed on schedule.
Third, Indian diplomacy must be flexible enough to include different actors in any country it shares borders with. The art of diplomacy is the ability to lessen local anti-Indian attitude instead of abhorring them. In a similar vein, dealing with the powerful is excellent policy, but dealing with the powerful alone is bad policy.
