Russia was the destination of Narendra Modi’s first overseas trip following his inauguration as India’s prime minister for the third time. Though not entirely unexpected, the visit was met with considerable doubts, curiosity, and optimism in various geopolitical circles worldwide. This time, Modi’s visit was anticipated to center on a very important and delicate topic of conversation—China—in addition to the standard bilateral problems of energy, connectivity, trade payments systems, health, and defense cooperation.
India is concerned about China’s growing power and weight in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, as well as its deepening strategic cooperation with Azerbaijan and developing connections with Russia. These developments are a result of India’s ongoing conflicts with China.
The bilateral relations between Beijing and Delhi have deteriorated since Galwan, and the current phase is still very demanding. However, India would like to use diplomacy and discussion to settle the boundary disputes at this point. I covered the benefits and drawbacks of standing with the West in order to handle the China problem in my earlier piece.
India can also investigate the possibility of establishing a backchannel conversation path via Moscow to Beijing. Maybe Modi’s trip to Moscow presents a great chance to investigate the Moscow backchannel. The fact that NSA Doval just visited Russia and met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi strengthens my case. The story of India’s role as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine conflict dominated media circles, but India’s outreach to China through Moscow is what really matters about this visit.
Upon initial observation, this appears highly ambiguous and gloomy, considering the rise of China and Russia as strategic allies, especially in the aftermath of the conflict in Ukraine. The conflict in Ukraine has exposed divisions in the global system. The US has forced Russians fully into China’s orbit by endorsing the Ukrainian opposition. They rely on China for their oil money in the face of Western sanctions.
In addition, China is a crucial ally in their struggle with the West and a cornerstone of their multipolar world order, which poses a threat to the US-led Western world order. Therefore, in the improbable case of a conflict between China and India, they would not be able to back India.
This makes it even harder for Russia to support India in spite of the unique, privileged, and historic cooperation between New Delhi and Moscow, especially in light of the strengthening of India’s ties with the West, especially after 2014.
A more thorough examination reveals that the Moscow channel is worthwhile to investigate. First and foremost, one must acknowledge the significance of developing a post-invasion scenario. Having said that, one can consider pre-invasion measures as well, such as how to prevent the worst case scenario—a mid-sized nuclear war between the Himalayan powers—by engaging in dialogue and diplomacy well in advance of the actual invasion.
Apart than high-altitude combat and periodic humiliation for both China and India, not much can be done in the post-invasion scenario; but, a lot may be done in the pre-invasion arena.
India in the present is not the India of 1962, as was previously said. Its position is not so precarious as to allow China to unilaterally set its conditions. It is a powerful and credible global actor because of its strategic autonomy, geographic location, technological superiority, strong military, sizable market, quickly expanding economy, strong political leadership under Modi, and thriving democracy.
Opposing powers, including the West and Russia, Israel and Iran, and the nations of the Global South, are always courting it. Due to its distinct position in international politics, India is able to negotiate and engage China in hard diplomatic bargaining from a position of strength. Moscow can also have a prominent role in this project.
It is important to realize that Moscow has a lot riding on the outcome of the India-China conflict before delving further into the Moscow channel. First of all, the friendship between Russia and India is ancient and civilizational. It is predicated on faith. For the past seventy-five years, it has been hard and polished. In the eyes of the general public, as well as in national security and diplomatic circles, Russia is a reliable partner.
2019 saw Russia back India’s move to revoke Article 370, and Prime Minister Modi stated that neither nation believes in meddling in the domestic affairs of the other. More recently, on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, India’s foreign minister Jaishankar defended India’s decision to buy Russian oil, saying that “Russia has never hurt India’s interests” in the midst of deteriorating India-US relations over India’s purchase of Russian oil, the murder of Sikh terrorist Hardeep Sing Nijjhar, and US concerns about alleged “democratic backsliding” and India’s minorities.
Further, he continued, “The relations of powers like Europe, the US, China, or Japan with Russia have all seen ups and downs. We have had a stable and always very friendly relationship with Russia. And our relationship with Russia today is based on this experience.” India has not given in to the Western pressure and refused to condemn Russia for the Ukraine war. India refused to back Western sanctions and continues to buy Russian oil against Western sanctions.
Furthermore, relations between Russia and India will get stronger in the fight against terrorism in the aftermath of the recent attacks in Russia by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP). Moscow certainly cherishes this partnership, but Putin will not be able to stand by India against China should China invade and spark a medium-sized conflict.
It may maintain its neutrality for a while, but due to Russia’s reliance on Beijing, it will eventually lose it. Then, it might have to stop providing India with oil and defense hardware, which would be a major blow to its already severely crippled economy from Western sanctions. Additionally, India will no longer be an ally that has mostly backed Russia on crucial geopolitical situations like Ukraine. India will be forced to strengthen its connections with the West, and Russia will suffer if India fully aligns itself with the US side.
Additionally, as a civilisation state, India is considered an independent pole in Russia’s conception of the multipolar world order. Russia’s conception of a multipolar world will be shaken by India’s evident tilt to the Western camp. Notably, “We are vitally interested in settling relations between these two great powers because if conflict breaks out between them (as the West is indeed pushing for), the prospects for a multipolar world will be indefinitely delayed,” wrote Alexander Dugin, Russia’s eminent philosopher and supposedly Putin’s brainstem.
In addition, Russia and China have a history of border conflicts and warfare. China is Russia’s geopolitical competitor in Central Asia and Eurasia. Moscow is undoubtedly concerned about China’s growth in these formerly Russian political and cultural spheres. India can be a useful counterbalance to China for Moscow, but losing India to the West will destroy those chances and increase Russia’s dependence on China. India’s status as a neutral state and strategic ally guarantees China some degree of pressure, which can help hold Beijing in check.
Last but not least, Russia is in a far better position to comprehend and communicate with Beijing, another “civilizational state,” as Dugin puts it. Numerous Indian diplomats informed me that diplomatic relations via Washington may irritate China and exacerbate its fears. But if Russia leads through the back channels, China knows all about the long-standing friendship between Russia and India, so this will be a more credible attempt without arousing unnecessary fears and suspicions.
There is therefore much room for combining the efforts; nonetheless, the Indian security and foreign policy establishment is still very skeptical and pessimistic about such novel concepts. The architects of policy are deeply concerned that Russia is moving closer to China and that, secondly, it is too focused on its efforts in Ukraine to give serious consideration to the India-China border dispute or seek any progress at the expense of Chinese assistance.
In geopolitics, there are no long-term answers; issues can only be handled temporarily until conditions alter. Therefore, the best course of action in the short term is to manage this dispute using the core principles of conflict avoidance and escalation containment.
This can be accomplished by carefully calibrating external balance to keep any hegemon from taking the lead. New Delhi’s approach can be a useful combination of psy-ops and coercive and soft diplomacy when pursuing it. India has to pursue multi-alignment and increase its influence in international politics rather than fully aligning with one block. Through multilateral venues such as the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi needs to engage with Western countries on an equal footing in the areas of technology, development, defense, and economics without putting itself in their crosshairs.
Without a doubt, China offers Europe enormous economic prospects, but India must take advantage of the fundamental divides and fault lines that exist over the Ukraine crisis, the dumping of Chinese goods, China’s intelligence operations, etc.
Japan may be the most important link in East and South Asia to resist China. In addition, India should keep bolstering its geostrategic and civilizational ties with Moscow while continuing to play a significant role in the affairs of the Global South, Africa, and the Middle East.
Many developing nations in the Global South see China’s debt traps and Belt and Road Initiative projects with skepticism and anxiety, which expands India’s strategic space—that is, if New Delhi can take advantage of it.
That being said, the exercise should not center on projecting an image of leadership on a worldwide scale. Like it did in 1962 when Jawahar Lal Nehru became the face of the Non-Aligned Movement and the de facto leader of the Third World, China is likely to see it as a danger to its global prominence and its vision of Asian unipolarity.
Rather, India needs to make the most of these international multilateral interactions in order to acquire tangible strategic advantage that it can utilize to put pressure on China and deter Beijing from continuing its military incursion into India.
In order to prevent the power gap from growing, the long-term objective should also be to improve technology, defense, space, cyber, and asymmetric capabilities while fortifying the economy and border infrastructure.
It is also in the best interests of the US to stop the neighboring Himalayan states from becoming more hostile. India will have to completely switch to the Western side if the conflict breaks out, which will deteriorate relations with Russia because it will be unable to help India.
Therefore, Washington should concentrate on avoiding the conflict from escalating rather than coercively persuading India to go belligerent against China if the US wants to maintain India as a credible and confident neutral voice—a much-needed geostrategic shock absorber in this highly polarized international order.
Russia will be further pushed into China by shortsighted goals of maintaining India’s unwavering advantage in the Western camp, a relationship that is quickly becoming into a strategic alliance. With the conflict in Ukraine, the US has already made the mistake of pressuring Moscow to join the Chinese military. If reason wins out, it would prefer not to repeat it, arranging India’s full turn toward the West in order to sever all connections with Russia.
Last but not least, Beijing itself needs to take the alternative of avoiding violence very seriously, since it will suffer greatly in terms of its standing as a world power if a military confrontation with Indians in Himalayan territory results in an embarrassing defeat.
