Following the Tatmadaw coup in 2021, Myanmar has been in a state of turmoil. The neighbors started to worry about the abrupt changes in Myanmar. India’s current infrastructure projects, which were intended to serve as the foundation for its ambitious Act East strategy, were a particular source of anxiety.
However, analysts in Myanmar were also closely examining China’s ties to the military regime and their own infrastructure projects, which continued to be a source of concern. But maintaining geostrategic ties with intricate nations like Myanmar is never simple, and India has legitimate concerns about the nature of its relationship with China.
The Three Brotherhood Alliance started Operation 1027 against the Tatmadaw in the northern part of Shan state, nearly three years after the military takeover in Myanmar. Their triumph over the Tatmadaw prompted the formation of Operation 1107, which united rebel factions from all throughout the nation.
This was maybe one of the few times in Myanmar’s turbulent history that Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) from different ethnic groupings have united in a carefully planned offensive against the regime. Although a lot of people viewed this as a democratic win, the reality was far more nuanced.
The notorious “four main families” lived in the city of Laukkaing in the self-administered area of Kokang, Shan State. These families, led by Ming Xuechang, Wei Chaoren, Liu Zhengxiang, and Liu Guoxi (who passed away in 2020), were not Shan State’s old money elites; rather, these four individuals contributed to turning this sleepy hamlet into a haven for con artists.
As Lukkaing began to change, a large number of gamblers from nearby nations—especially China, where gambling is prohibited—started to visit the area. Along with other illicit activities, the “four main families” expanded their company to include money laundering, telecom scams, and trafficking. Naturally, without the assistance of the Tatmadaw and the local police, this would not have been feasible.
As a result of these gangs’ use of high-paying professions in controlled environments—a practice known as “cyber slavery”—as well as internet scams to entice Chinese nationals, China, which was hardest hit by this wild town, started to exert pressure on the Tatmadaw to regulate these families.
However, the Mings and others balked, knowing that billions of dollars were on the line. China decided to launch the highly effective Operation 1027 in October of last year in order to bring the Three Brotherhood Alliance to a halt, as its dissatisfaction with the Tatmadaw remained unrelenting and its concerns unmet.
This was made simple because Peng Jiasheng, a.k.a. the “King of Kokang,” was the original Laukkaing warlord and the MNDAA’s leader. It was none other than current prime minister Min Aung Hlaing who led the coup in 2021 and removed Peng.
Peng Jiasheng was deposed by Hlaing using Bai Suocheng, Peng’s deputy at the time. Following their successful expulsion of Peng, who sought asylum in China in 2009, Bai Suocheng emerged as one of Kokang’s “four families”.
Peng’s close proximity to China and Chinese ethnicity contributed to his tense relationship with the military regime. Ultimately, it was his negotiation that resulted in Kokang’s designation as a special administrative zone, with Yuan serving as the medium of exchange and Mandarin as the language of instruction.
Remarkably, China has chosen not to acknowledge Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of Myanmar’s junta, suggesting that animosity between the two nations persists. Prior to this, China was cautious of President Thein Sein’s intentions toward the West and vice versa when he chose to open up Myanmar to the outside world.
Beijing interpreted it as Naypyidaw trying to play both sides, or at the very least sidelining China for the West. But for a while, things were better in partnerships after Aung San Suu Kyi. In actuality, she came to power just prior to the 2015 elections. President Xi Jinping was her host on her official visit to China, which she accepted.
In addition, the West strongly objected to her treatment of the Rohingyas, which forced China to take center stage in Myanmar when President Xi Jinping, the country’s first Chinese leader to visit in more than two decades, made a trip there in 2020.
However, this burgeoning partnership was short-lived as the Rohingya crisis brought Aung San Suu Kyi closer to the military regime and public opinion in Myanmar turned against China due to the obvious movement of Chinese people.
Significant worries have also been raised in Myanmar regarding China’s illicit extraction of essential rare earth minerals, which has rendered regions the size of Singapore unusable for agriculture and poisoned the rivers. This has led to widespread demonstrations against China.
Furthermore, China’s worries about the Tatmadaw extend beyond cybercrime and gaming networks based in Myanmar. China faces a dilemma since the Tatmadaw has failed to stabilize Myanmar or successfully consolidate its control, endangering China’s infrastructure investments.
China’s alternative to its “Achilles heel,” the Strait of Malacca, will remain vulnerable without political stability and control over EAOs, regardless of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), its oil and gas pipelines, or the Kyaukphyu deep seaport. China has expressed interest in resuming some of the projects due to its influence on EAOs, but Myanmar’s balancing act has alarmed it once more.
Russia was selected by the Tatmadaw to construct the Dawei deep seaport, which will serve as a gateway to the Greater Mekong region. Dawei is located in the Tanintharyi region on Russia’s east coast. India stands to gain from this expansion, which China perceives as damaging its Kyaukphyu deep seaport. By bringing in a third party to infrastructure projects that support India’s efforts to curb China’s expanding influence, Russia’s interests in Myanmar will help create a secure Indian Ocean.
Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing and China’s foreign minister Wang Yi met on August 15 to talk about border security and Chinese investments in Myanmar. Although relationships have their limitations, authorities from both countries once referred to their growing relationship as pauk phaw, or a fraternal brotherhood.
China is concerned and irritated in this instance about Hlaing’s failure to maintain control over the worsening circumstances surrounding EAOs. They also know full well that Hlaing has a special mistrust of China.
In June of this year, a second Operation 1027 was initiated. There are clear indications that China is against another Operation, despite the fact that it is known that China supported the initial Operation 1027 and later mediated the ceasefire between the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the military junta. But the fact that a second operation was started suggests that Beijing does not have total control over these EAOs.
However, Hlaing has also made statements charging that foreign nations are arming EAOs rather than providing humanitarian relief. Most likely, what he was talking about was China.
Without a doubt, China will keep protecting its geopolitical assets in Myanmar. However, China would prefer a Tatmadaw that is able to maintain control over Myanmar while also allowing Beijing to continue its participation in the nation. For instance, mediating a truce for Operation 1027 and implicitly endorsing it.
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India needs to be mindful that Myanmar is not a soft target for China, even as it keeps a careful watch on events there. India is arguably more friendly than China will ever be with the military junta, the National Unity Government, and certain EAOs.
Additionally, the general public’s opinion would be more in favor of India than China. There is little indication that elections would bring an end to the conflict, thus the anarchy in Myanmar is here to stay.
India’s best course of action in Myanmar is to safeguard its interests and interact with relevant parties, all the while providing humanitarian aid and basking in the mutual goodwill that already exists.
